The Effectiveness of Macroeconomic Commitment in Weak(er) Institutional Environments
This paper analyzes the institutional conditions affecting the establishment and effectiveness of independent central banks and of budgetary institutions. It draws on the recent theory developed by North, Wallis and Weingast on the transition from a closed and fragile state to an open economic and political environment. The paper presents a composite indicator allowing for the identification of a country’s position along this transition path. The findings suggest that (i) while the establishment of autonomous central banks seems to be relatively independent from the broader institutional framework, sound budgetary institutions tend to be established in countries with higher levels of rule of law for the elites, and (ii) while central bank independence is effective in reducing inflation irrespective of a country’s position along the transition path, budget institutions seem to be most effective as a disciplining device in weak institutional environments.
- ISBN 13 : 1455204390
- ISBN 10 : 9781455204397
- Judul : The Effectiveness of Macroeconomic Commitment in Weak(er) Institutional Environments
- Pengarang : Mr. Marc Quintyn, Sophia Gollwitzer, Sophia Gollwitzer, Sophia Gollwitzer, Sophia Gollwitzer, Sophia Gollwitzer,
- Kategori : Business & Economics
- Penerbit : International Monetary Fund
- Bahasa : en
- Tahun : 2010
- Halaman : 59
- Halaman : 59
- Google Book : http://books.google.co.id/books?id=wxTx5oz8-IEC&dq=intitle:the+effectiveness&hl=&source=gbs_api
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Ketersediaan :
... country' s performance under the rule of law for the elites and under perpetual
organizations is linked to the quality of its BI. B. Econometric Analysis In the first
part of the econometric analysis we ask if a country's performance under the
doorstep conditions determines the quality of its MCI as measured by the CBI and
BI indices. In the second part we analyze whether the fulfillment of the three
doorstep conditions has an effect on the impact of MCI on inflation and public
external debt.